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Is There A Uniform Trust Act 
in Your Future? 
The National Conference of Com­missioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) is close to 
completing the first comprehensive 
attempt at the national level to codify 
the law of trusts-the Uniform Trust 
Act (Act). This article describes the 
reasons for the Act and many of its 
provisions. The Act is scheduled 
for final reading and approval by 
NCCUSL during the summer of 
2000, meaning that states may begin 
enacting the Act in its final form in 
their 2001 legislative sessions. This 
article is based on the draft discussed 
at NCCUSL' s 1999 annual meeting. 
Background 
Although the Act will be the first 
comprehensive uniform act on the sub­
ject of trusts, comprehensive trust 
statutes are already in effect in several 
states. Notable examples include Cali­
fornia, Georgia, Indiana and Texas. 
These comprehensive state statutes, as 
well as the trust statutes in many other 
states, influenced the drafters of the 
Act, who borrowed from these 
statutes in preparing the Act. 
There are several reasons why the 
drafting of a uniform act on trusts is 
timely. The immediate stimulus for 
the drafting of the Act is the much 
greater use of trusts in recent years, 
both in family estate planning and 
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commercial transactions in the United 
States and internationally. This greater 
use of trusts, and the consequent 
increase in the number of day-to-day 
questions involving trusts, led to a 
recognition that the trust law in many 
states is quite thin. It also led to a 
recognition that the existing uniform 
acts relating to trusts, although numer­
ous, are incomplete. The primary 
source of trust law in most states is the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts and 
the multi-volume treatises by Scott 
and Bogert. These sources, however, 
fail to address many practical issues 
and sometimes provide conflicting 
guidance. It is hoped that the Act will 
provide precise answers to these ques­
tions in an easily findable place. Thus, 
the Act will serve an important educa­
tional function. Lawyers in many 
states will for the first time be able 
actually to determine their state law 
on trusts. 
Many uniform acts on trust law 
topics exist, but none provide compre­
hensive coverage. The Act incorpo­
rates certain of these smaller acts. 
Other uniform acts that address more 
specialized topics will continue to be 
available for enactment in freestand­
ing form. Still others are now obsolete. 
The Act incorporates, with many 
updates, the 1964 Uniform Trustee 
Powers Act, enacted in 16 states. The 
Act also incorporates without change 
the 1994 Uniform Prudent Investor 
Act enacted to date in 35 states. States 
enacting the Act should repeal their 
version of the Uniform Trustee Powers 
Act and recodify into the larger Act 
their version of the Uniform Prudent 
Investor Act. Existing uniform acts that 
the Act does not touch include the Uni­
form Principal and Income Act, Man­
agement of Institutional Funds Act, 
Custodial Trust Act, Common Trust 
Fund Act, Supervision of Trustees for 
Charitable Purposes Act and Testa­
mentary Additions to Trusts Act. 
Now obsolete, at least for states 
enacting the Act, is Article VII of the 
Uniform Probate Code. Article VII is 
a mini trust statute addressing only 
selected topics, focusing primarily 
on trust registration, jurisdiction and 
trustee liability to third persons. The 
1937 Uniform Trusts Act is also obso­
lete, even though only six states 
enacted it and none within the past 
several decades. Despite its ambitious 
and similar title, the 1937 act was like­
wise a limited statute. Its principal 
focus was the duty of loyalty, the 
voting of securities by trustees and, 
similar to Uniform Probate Code 
Article VII, trustee liability to 
third persons. 
The Act is being drafted in coor­
dination with the revision of the 
Restatement of Trusts. The American 
Law Institute (ALI) approved the 
'�Lawyers in many states will for the first time be able actually 
to determine their state law on trusts." 
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Restatement (Second) of Trusts, the
last complete edition of this work,
in 1957. Beginning in the late 1980s,
work on the Restatement (Third)
began under the leadership of Edward
Halbach of the University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley; Halbach is the Restate-
ment's reporter. The ALI completed
and approved the portion of Restate-
ment (Third) relating to the prudent
investor rule and other investment
topics in 1992. This portion formed
the basis for the 1994 Uniform Prudent
Investor Act.
In 1996, the ALI approved a tenta-
tive draft of the portion of Restate-
ment (Third) relating to the rules on
the creation and validity of trusts. In
May 1999, the ALI also approved a
tentative draft of the portion relating
to the office of trustee, interpretation
of trusts and spendthrift provisions
and the rights of creditors. Because the
ALI must approve at least two more
tentative drafts before the Restatement
(Third) is complete, work on it will
continue well beyond the completion
of the Act. As a result of the coordina-
tion between the two projects, many
provisions of the Act track the con-
cepts expressed in the Restatement
(Third) and, for parts of the Restate-
ment (Third) not yet completed,
the relevant portions of the earlier
Restatement (Second).
Although the Act is a comprehen-
sive trust statute, it does not attempt
to codify all trust law. Rather, the
Act codifies only those portions of
trust law that are most amenable to
codification. The Act omits no major
trust law topic but leaves much of the
detail, particularly on topics such as
interpretation of trust terms and
remedies for breach of trust, to
the common law of trusts and
principles of equity. Nowhere is
the common law more clearly stated
than in the various Restatements of
Trusts. Lawyers who require further
explication on the meaning of one or
more of the provisions of the Act will
probably find it by consulting not
only the comments to the Act, but
also the Restatements.
Overview of the Act
The organization of the Act indi-
cates its scope. The drafters organized
the Act into 11 articles. In addition
to providing definitions, Article 1
addresses topics such as the ability
of a trust instrument to override the
Act's provisions, the validity of choice
of law provisions and the law to gov-
ern in the absence of a choice and the
procedure for transferring the princi-
pal place of administration to another
jurisdiction. Article 2 addresses
selected topics involving judicial
proceedings concerning trusts. This
minimal coverage was deliberate
because the drafting committee con-
cluded that most issues relating to
jurisdiction and procedure are best
left to other bodies of law, such as the
rules of civil procedure. Article 3 deals
with the important topic of representa-
tion of beneficiaries, including princi-
ples of virtual representation, which
apply whether the matter is to be
resolved in or out of court.
Article 4, which begins the heart of
the Act, specifies the requirements for
creating, modifying and terminating
trusts. The provisions on the creation
of trusts largely track traditional doc-
trine; those relating to modification
and termination liberalize the law, at
least in most states. Article 5 covers
spendthrift provisions and rights of
creditors, both of the settlor and bene-
ficiaries. Article 6 collects special rules
relating to revocable trusts, including
the standard of capacity, the procedure
for revocation or modification and the
statute of limitations on contests.
Article 7 turns to the office of
trustee, specifying the rules, absent
special provision in the trust, on a
variety of topics. Included are the
rules on trustee acceptance, rights
and obligations of co-trustees, the
procedure for resignation, the
grounds for removal, the methods
for appointing successors and
trustee compensation.
Article 8, entitled "Fiduciary
Administration," prescribes the duties
and powers of the trustee. The powers
listed are an updated version of the
Uniform Trustee Powers Act, includ-
ing coverage of such current topics as
the power to deal with environmental
hazards. The specified duties of the
trustee, like the duty of loyalty, are not
new, but the particulars have changed
over the years. The Act reflects this
trend. The drafters prepared Article
8 where possible to conform to the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act. The
Uniform Prudent Investor Act pre-
scribes a trustee's responsibilities
with regard to the management and
investment of trust property. The
Act expands on this by specifying
the trustee's duties for distributions
to beneficiaries.
Article 9 provides a place for the
jurisdiction enacting the larger Uni-
form Trust Act to codify its version
of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act.
Although trustee investment is central
to the law of trusts, due to the wide-
spread enactment of the Uniform Pru-
dent Investor Act, the drafters made
no effort to integrate fully the Prudent
Investor Act into the larger Act. The
enacting jurisdiction may instead cod-
ify its version of the Uniform Prudent
Investor Act in Article 9 without sub-
stantive change.
Article 10 addresses the liability of
trustees and rights of beneficiaries. As
to the rights of beneficiaries, Article 10:
- lists the equitable remedies for
breach of trust;
0 specifies how money damages
are to be determined;
o provides that a court may award
attorneys' fees against the trustee, the
trust or even a beneficiary, as justice
and equity may require; and
* specifies certain trustee defenses,
including the addition of a statute of
limitations for claims alleging breach
of trust and a provision on the enforce-
ability of exculpatory clauses.
As to liability of trustees to third
persons, the Act emphasizes the need
for trustees and others to engage in
commercial transactions with trust
property to the same extent as if the
property were not held in trust. To
protect the privacy of settlors, Article
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10 concludes with a provision autho-
rizing trustees to provide and for third
parties to rely on a certification by the
trustee as to the specific trust terms
relevant to the transaction.
Article 11, which is still a work
in progress, deals with the application
of the Act to existing trusts. The intent
is to give the Act the widest possible
application consistent with constitu-
tional limitations. Consequently, the
Act generally applies not only to trusts
created on or after the effective date,
but also to existing trusts.
A complete analysis of all of the
Act's provisions is beyond the scope
of this article. What follows is a
review of the topics and sections of
the proposed Act that are the most
innovative or that have generated
the most discussion.
Default Rules
Nearly all of the Act consists of
default rules that are subject to varia-
tion in the terms of the trust. This is
hardly news. Most statutory provi-
sions on trust law have always been
subject to override in the terms of the
trust. What is innovative about the
Act is the effort for the first time to
collect the circumstances when the
terms of the trust cannot override the
statute. Included among the rules that
a settlor cannot override are:
- the requirements for creating
a trust;
* the rights of third parties in their
dealings with the trustee;
* the power of the court to take
certain actions, such as removing a
trustee;
* a trustee's obligation to act as
a fiduciary in good faith and with
regard to the purposes of the trust and
the interests of the beneficiaries; and
* as described below, the trustee's
duty to keep the beneficiaries
informed.
Revocable Trusts
Recognizing the increasing use and
importance of revocable trusts, the
"Although the Act is a comprehensive trust
statute, it does not attempt to codify all trust law.
Rather, the Act codifies only those portions of trust
law that are most amenable to codification."
Act collects in one place most of the
provisions relating to revocable trusts.
Article 6 specifies a capacity standard
for creating a revocable trust (the same
standard as for a will), provides a pro-
cedure for revocation, adds a statute
of limitations on contests and extends
to revocable trusts the enacting juris-
diction's rules on the construction
of wills. Eliminating a trap for the
unwary, the Act follows the lead of
California, Montana, Oklahoma and
Texas in providing that a trust is
presumed revocable unless stated
otherwise. To avoid the unintentional
rewriting of an existing trust, however,
the Act limits the presumption of
revocability to trusts executed after the
Act's effective date.
The Act allows a revocable trust
to be contested on the same basis as
a will, including for lack of capacity,
undue influence and fraud. The plain-
tiff must bring the contest no later
than two years after the settlor's
death, but the trustee may shorten
the period to 120 days for a potential
contestant by notifying the potential
contestant of the trust's existence.
Although the beneficiaries remain
liable to return distributions made
before the expiration of the contest
period if the trust later turns out to
have been invalid, the Act generally
protects the trustee. To encourage
expeditious distribution of trust prop-
erty, a trustee may without liability
begin distributions immediately fol-
lowing the settlor's death. The trustee
loses this protection only if the trustee
is aware that a contest has been
brought or the trustee has been noti-
fied of a possible contest, followed by
its actual filing within 30 days.
Modification and
Termination of Trusts
Due to the increasing use in recent
years of long-term trusts, there is a
need for greater flexibility in the cur-
rent restrictive rules on when a trust
may be modified or terminated other
than as provided in the trust's terms.
The Act provides this increased flexi-
bility without losing sight of the fact
that the settlor's intent is paramount.
At common law, an irrevocable
trust could be modified or terminated
by agreement of the settlor and benefi-
ciaries, or by agreement of the benefi-
ciaries alone if the trust no longer
served a material purpose. In addition,
the administrative terms of a trust
could be modified or terminated due
to circumstances that the settlor did
not anticipate, and a court could
reform either the administrative or
dispositive terms of a trust to correct
for a mistake of law or fact. Modifica-
tion of a trust to achieve desired tax
results could be accomplished only if
it fit within one of the already estab-
lished categories.
The Act retains but builds on the
common law rules. Among the provi-
sions providing a liberalizing nudge
are the following:
* Although a spendthrift provi-
sion can be a material purpose
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barring termination of a trust by
the beneficiaries, this is not an
automatic presumption.
* A court's ability to modify or
terminate a trust because of circum-
stances not anticipated by the settlor
is extended to the trust's dispositive
provisions.
* A trust may be reformed due to
the settlor's mistake of law or fact
even if the terms of the trust, as origi-
nally but mistakenly created, are
unambiguous.
0 To achieve the settlor's tax objec-
tives, a court may modify the terms of
the trust as long as the modification
does not violate the settlor's probable
intention. The court may also give
such a modification retroactive effect.
Not recognized at common law,
but recognized in many state statutes
and also in the Act, is the power in a
trustee to combine trusts or divide a
trust without court approval. The
Act also authorizes a court to termi-
nate an uneconomic trust, and permits
a trustee, without court approval, to
terminate a trust with a value of
$50,000 or less.
Cy Pres
Responding to the suggestions
of numerous commentators, the Act
broadens a court's ability to apply cy
pres to charitable trusts. A court may
apply cy pres to modify or terminate a
charitable trust not only when fulfill-
ing the settlor's original charitable
purpose would be impossible or
unlawful but also when such effort
would be impracticable or wasteful.
The Act also abolishes the often artifi-
cial distinction between general and
specific charitable intent. The Act
instead creates a presumption of
general charitable intent. Absent a
contrary provision in the terms of the
trust providing for disposition to the
trust property, in applying cy pres,
the court must apply or distribute
the property in a manner consistent
with the settlor's charitable purposes.
Finally, the Act recognizes that default
provisions in favor of noncharities that
are remote in time can sometimes
cause more mischief than help, neces-
sitating detailed searches for heirs
and the running of property through
numerous estates. Consequently,
although the settlor may direct that a
trustee distribute trust property to a
noncharitable beneficiary on the fail-
ure or impracticality of the original
charitable scheme, such a default pro-
vision is effective for only 30 years
from the date of the trust's creation.
Beneficiary Rights
The Act contains a series of provi-
sions relating to the rights of bene-
ficiaries. Some merely repeat the com-
mon law; others are new. Among the
more significant are the provisions on
trustee removal and the obligation to
keep the beneficiaries informed. In
addition to removal for committing a
breach of trust, a court may remove a
trustee in the following situations:
* if a lack of cooperation among
co-trustees substantially impairs the
trust's administration;
- if the investment decisions of the
trustee, even though not constituting a
breach of trust, have resulted in invest-
ment performance persistently and
substantially below that of comparable
trusts; or
* if, because of changed circum-
stances, unfitness or an unwillingness
or inability to administer the trust,
removal would be in the best interests
of the beneficiaries. Removal of a cor-
porate trustee because of changed cir-
cumstances might be appropriate, for
example, if the trustee has totally
changed its character due to a corpo-
rate merger or acquisition.
When in doubt, the Act favors dis-
closure to beneficiaries as the better
policy. The Act imposes both a general
obligation on the trustee to keep
"qualified" beneficiaries reasonably
informed of administration, as well as
several specific notice requirements.
The term "qualified beneficiaries,"
which is used with some frequency in
the Act, excludes beneficiaries with
remote remainder interests.
The Act requires a trustee to notify
qualified beneficiaries of the trustee's
acceptance of office and of any change
in the method or rate of the trustee's
compensation. In addition, the Act
codifies the common law duty pre-
scribed in cases such as Allard v.
Pacific National Bank, 663 P.2d 104
(Wash. 1983), to inform qualified
beneficiaries in advance of a sale or
other disposition of real estate, tangi-
ble personal property or closely-held
securities comprising a significant
portion of the trust value. The Act
waives disclosure only if forbidden
by law, as can occur with certain
securities transactions, or if disclo-
sure would be detrimental to the
interests of the beneficiaries, a stan-
dard that might apply if disclosure
would result in the loss of the only
serious buyer.
The Act requires trustees to make
regular reports to a trust's qualified
beneficiaries. In particular, the trustee
must furnish the qualified beneficia-
ries at least annually with a report of
the trust property, liabilities, receipts
and disbursements, including the
source and amount of the trustee's
compensation.
The trustee must also promptly
respond to any beneficiary's request
for information, unless the request
is unreasonable under the circum-
stances. This includes a requirement
that the trustee furnish a beneficiary
with a complete copy of the trust
instrument. The drafting committee
rejected the more limited approach
of letting the trustee determine
which provisions of the trust were
material to the beneficiary's interests.
The trustee's version of what is
material could differ markedly
from what the beneficiary believes
is relevant.
A trust instrument generally can-
not waive the trustee's duty to keep
the beneficiaries informed. The Act,
however, creates an exception for ben-
eficiaries under age 25. The Act also
allows "blind" trusts to waive some




The Act recognizes that a trustee is
entitled to reasonable protection from
liability. To allow a beneficiary ade-
quate time in which to bring a claim
yet enable the trustee to limit potential
exposure, the Act includes a statute of
limitations. Absent fraud or misrepre-
sentation, a beneficiary who claims a
breach of trust must commence a judi-
cial proceeding within one year after
the trustee sends the beneficiary a
report adequately disclosing the facts
constituting the claim. This statute of
limitations, however, will not be trig-
gered unless the report informs the
beneficiary of the time bar. A benefi-
ciary's consent, release or ratification
of a transaction may also bar the bene-
ficiary from bringing a claim.
A settlor may include an exculpa-
tory clause in a trust instrument that
limits a trustee's potential liability, and
a trustee may rely on such a clause,
but not without limit. Under tradi-
tional doctrine, an exculpatory clause
is unenforceable (a) to the extent that
it relieves a trustee from liability for
breach of trust committed in bad faith
or with reckless indifference to the
trust purposes or the beneficiaries; or
(b) if it was inserted as a result of the
trustee's abuse of a fiduciary or confi-
dential relationship between the
trustee and settlor. Disapproving of
cases such as Marsman v. Nasca, 573
N.E.2d 1025 (Mass. Ct. App. 1991),
the Act subjects exculpatory clauses
drafted by or on behalf of the trustee
to special scrutiny. The Act presumes
that the trustee inserted such exculpa-
tory provisions as a result of an abuse
of a fiduciary or confidential relation-
ship unless the trustee establishes that
the provision is fair under the circum-
stances and that the trustee adequately
communicated its existence and con-
tents to the settlor.
Although a trust instrument
normally contains the entire terms
of the trust, the Act allows a court to
admit extrinsic evidence to clarify
ambiguities, many of which are not
necessarily apparent from a reading
"Recognizing the increasing use and importance of
revocable trusts, the Act collects in one place most
of the provisions relating to revocable trusts."
of an instrument. Alternatively,
grounds may exist, such as a mistake
of law or fact, resulting in the refor-
mation of apparently unambiguous
terms. To allow a trustee to administer
a trust with some dispatch and with-
out concern over misplaced reliance
on the language of the trust instru-
ment, the Act provides that a trustee is
not liable for a breach of trust to the
extent that the breach resulted from
reasonable reliance on the written
terms of the trust.
Representation of Beneficiaries
Article 3 of the Act contains a
comprehensive set of provisions on
representation of beneficiaries. Article
3 addresses not only representation by
fiduciaries such as guardians, conser-
vators and personal representatives,
but also what is known as virtual rep-
resentation (the representation of
minors, the incapacitated, the unborn
and the unascertained) by beneficiaries
who are legally competent and whose
interests are substantially identical.
The representation provisions may
be used whether a dispute is in court
or is to be settled nonjudicially. The
provisions are available for matters
of ongoing trust administration, such
as notice to the beneficiaries of a
trustee's resignation or of an annual
report. The provisions also apply to
issues involving beneficiary consent,
such as the appointment of successor
trustees or the termination by the ben-
eficiaries of a trust that no longer
serves a material purpose.
The representation provisions are
an added tool that can solve many
practical problems. Lawyers, however,
should not rely on them without
thought. Representation is not binding
if there is a conflict of interest between
the representative and those ostensibly
represented. In that event, the lawyer
should consider the appointment of a
guardian ad litem--termed a "special
representative" under the Act--whose
appointment is available whether the
matter is to be resolved by the court or
by nonjudicial settlement.
Principal Place of Administration
Determining a trust's principal
place of administration is important
for a variety of reasons, including
determining which state's income tax,
if any, applies to the trust's income.
As trust administration has become
more complex, determining a trust's
principal place of administration has
become more difficult. Co-trustees
may be located in different states. A
corporate trustee's personal trust offi-
cers may be located in one state, its
investment division in another and
its operations facilities in yet another.
In addition, a variety of nontrustees,
such as investment advisers and trust
protectors, may play a role in a trust's
administration. By defining the trust's
principal place of administration as
the usual place where the day-to-day
activity of the trust is carried on by
the trustee or cotrustee primarily
responsible for its administration,
the Act resolves some, but by no
means all, of these difficulties. For
this reason, the Act encourages sett-
lors to address this issue in the trust
provisions. A provision in a trust
instrument that designates the princi-
pal place of administration is valid
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and controlling under the Act as
long as a trustee's principal place
of business is located in or a trustee is
a resident of the designated jurisdic-
tion, or if all or part of the trust's
administration occurs in the desig-
nated place.
Frequently it becomes necessary
to change a trust's principal place of
administration. Ideally the trust instru-
ment should address this issue. Absent
such a provision, the Act specifies a
procedure for transfer. The transfer
must facilitate the trust's administra-
tion and not impair the beneficiaries'
interests. Furthermore, the trustee
must inform the qualified beneficiaries
of the transfer at least 60 days in
advance. If, however, the transfer
involves the appointment of a new
trustee, the requirements for the
appointment of a successor trustee,
either under the trust instrument or
otherwise, must first be satisfied.
Environmental Liability
The Act contains a series of provi-
sions designed to respond to trustee
concerns about possible liability for
accepting and holding property with
environmental hazards. Although a
trustee need not sign a formal accep-
tance and can accept the office of
trustee by commencing to perform
trustee duties, the Act clarifies that
the inspection or investigation of trust
property to determine potential envi-
ronmental liability is not evidence
of an implied acceptance. A trustee
may also take action to prevent, abate
or remedy any actual or potential
violation of environmental law;
decline to accept property or disclaim
any power with respect to property;
compromise claims over alleged vio-
lation of environmental law; and pay
from trust property the expenses
related to such actions. Finally, a
trustee cannot be held personally
liable under the Act merely because
the trustee holds title to property con-
taining environmental hazards. Liabil-
ity attaches in such cases only against
the trust property.
Proprietary Mutual Funds
Common trust funds have rapidly
disappeared from corporate trustees'
portfolios, replaced by "proprietary"
mutual funds. The advantage of the
proprietary fund is that capital gains
taxation can be avoided on trust termi-
nation. Because they could not be held
other than in trust, common trust
funds holdings had to be liquidated.
Proprietary mutual funds, on the other
hand, can be distributed in kind.
Despite this seeming advantage,
proprietary cause considerable contro-
versy and litigation, implicating the
trustee's duty of loyalty, the duty to
invest with prudence and the right to
receive only reasonable compensation.
Because corporate trustees ordinarily
provide advisory services to and
receive compensation from the funds
that they create, some critics argue that
investing the assets of individual
trusts in proprietary mutual funds is
not necessarily a matter of prudence
but is primarily a method for generat-
ing additional fee income. In addition,
because a corporate trustee often
will also charge its regular fee for
administering the trust, critics charge
that a corporate trustee's total com-
pensation, both direct and indirect,
is excessive.
Despite these concerns, nearly all
states have passed statutes that autho-
rize corporate trustees to invest in
proprietary mutual funds, regardless
of whether the trustee will receive
additional fees. Recognizing this
political reality, the Act does not pro-
hibit ifvestment in proprietary mutual
funds but clarifies that these invest-
ments are subject to traditional fidu-
ciary responsibilities. The investment
in the proprietary fund must comply
with the prudent investor rule of the
enacting jurisdiction. Furthermore,
only services actually performed for
such compensation may be taken into
account in determining a trustee's rea-
sonable compensation. If by investing
in proprietary funds the trustee in effect
delegates functions it would have oth-
erwise performed in its regular trustee
capacity, the trustee's regular compen-
sation should be reduced. Finally, the
trustee must disclose at least annually
to the persons entitled to receive the
trustee's annual report the rate of extra
compensation received for providing
services to the fund and the method for
determining this compensation.
Spendthrift Provisions and
Rights of Beneficiaries' Creditors
Crafting the provisions of Article 5
on spendthrift protection and the
rights of a beneficiary's creditors
to reach the trust proved to be the
most difficult task in drafting the
Act. The area is controversial, and
conflicting policy directions yield
different results. The result was a com-
promise, responding at least in part to
the concerns of the different factions.
The Act follows the law currently
in force in all but a few states by pro-
viding that a trust is spendthrift only
if the terms of the trust so provide. It
then clarifies a point unclear in many
states. To receive spendthrift treat-
ment, the provision must restrain both
voluntary and involuntary transfer
of the beneficiary's interest. The draft-
ing committee concluded that it was
undesirable as a matter of policy for
a beneficiary to be able to transfer the
beneficiary's interest while at the same
time denying the beneficiary's credi-
tors the right to reach the trust to
satisfy their claims.
The key public policy issue in the
spendthrift area is determining which
classes of creditors should be exempt
from the spendthrift bar. In determin-
ing these exceptions, the drafting com-
mittee did not start from scratch, but
rather paid particular attention to the
exceptions listed in Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Trusts § 157 and Restatement
(Third) of Trusts § 59.
Both Restatements and many
states' trust statutes, as well as other
relevant statutes such as Federal Bank-
ruptcy Code § 523(a)(5) and ERISA
§ 206(d)(3), grant special deference
to the enforcement of court orders
for support or maintenance of the
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beneficiary's child, current spouse and
former spouse. Given this background
and the important public policy con-
cerns in making certain that those to
whom legal obligations of support are
owed actually receive such support,
the Act provides that a beneficiary's
child, current spouse or former spouse
who has a judgment against the bene-
ficiary for support or maintenance
may obtain against the trust, in an
appropriate judicial proceeding, an
order attaching present or future dis-
tributions to or for the benefit of the
beneficiary. In addition, if the trustee
has abused a discretion or failed to
comply with a standard of distribu-
tion, the court may direct the trustee
to pay the child, current spouse or
former spouse an amount that is equi-
table under the circumstances, but not
more than what the trustee would
have been obligated to pay the benefi-
ciary had the trustee not abused the
discretion or failed to comply with
the standard.
The other public policy issue that
engendered considerable debate was
whether the Act should create an
exception to the spendthrift bar for
creditors who have furnished the ben-
eficiary with so called "necessities."
Even though the necessities doctrine
was perhaps originally derived with
the greengrocer in mind, today it is
used almost exclusively by govern-
ment agencies seeking reimbursement
for the costs of providing care or to
deny eligibility for Medicaid on the
theory that the beneficiary's interest in
trust is an available resource. Sophisti-
cated drafting normally can protect a
trust from government claims and
result in the exclusion of the trust as
an available resource. Absent such
sophisticated counsel, however, a
necessities exception would be largely
a trap for the unwary. Recognizing the
important role that third party trusts
play in assuring an enhanced quality
of life for individuals with disabilities,
the drafting committee elected not to
create an exception to the spendthrift
bar for providers of necessities. If
governmental agencies are to obtain
reimbursement for the costs of care,
they must rely on other law.
Self-Settled Trusts
The Act treats rights of a settlor's
creditor to reach the trust separately
from the claims of a beneficiary's
creditors because the issues are differ-
ent. As to the rights of the settlor's
creditors, the Act follows traditional
doctrine, rejecting and questioning
the wisdom of the recent Alaska,
Delaware, Nevada and Rhode Island
statutes. Under the Act, a settlor's
creditor may reach whatever the
trustee could have paid to the settlor,
whether or not distributions to the
settlor-beneficiary are subject to the
trustee's discretion and whether or
not the trust is irrevocable. Consistent
with the law everywhere, the Act also
provides that, during the lifetime of
the settlor, the property of a revocable
trust is subject to the claims of the sett-
lor's creditors in the same manner as if
no trust were created. Following the
settlor's death, however, the now
irrevocable trust is subject to creditor
claims only to the extent that the sett-
lor's probate estate is insufficient to
satisfy such obligations.
Following a trend in the law, the
Act treats holders of presently exercis-
able powers of withdrawal the same
as if the holders, because of their
power to obtain the trust property,
were the settlors of revocable trusts.
The result is that trust property subject
to a power of withdrawal is fully
subject to the claims of the holder's
creditors and, following the power's
lapse or release, remains liable to the
extent of the power holder's beneficial
interest in the trust. The Act, however,
creates an important exception to this
general rule. Conforming with the
expectations of the settlors who create
such arrangements, property subject
to a Crummey or "5 x 5" power is
not, following the lapse or release of
the power, subject to the claims of the
power holder's creditors.
Conclusion
This article only samples the Act's
provisions. For more information,
readers should consult the draft Act
itself, which, with extensive com-
ments, is available at www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm. Com-
ments are welcome. They may be most
efficiently provided by e-mailing the
author at englishda@missouri.edu.
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"[A] trustee cannot be held personally
liable under the Act merely because the
trustee holds title to property containing
environmental hazards. Liability attaches in
such cases only against the trust property."
